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PRIOR TO 2006, M I C H A E L  I G N A T I E F F  W A S  A  H A R V A R D  A C A D E M I C  and a minor 
British celebrity known by many for his TV appearances and his star-studded wedding guest list 
more than for his political aspirations. But his entrance into Canadian politics in 2006 and as-
cendance to leader of the Liberal Party in 2008 gave him new visibility in his home country. Ig-
natieff’s long absence from Canada—he lived outside the country for more than thirty years—
was a primary source of criticism throughout his political career and was often interpreted as a 
lack of attachment to Canada. In May 2009, the Conservative Party launched a series of attack 
ads that amplified these sentiments, depicting Ignatieff as a political outsider whose commit-
ment to Canadian politics was new and untrustworthy. According to his opponents, Ignatieff 
lacked dependability and experience, implying that he could not, or would not, meet the obliga-
tions demanded of a head of state. As their “Ignatieff: Just Visiting” advertisements claimed, 
“he’s not in it for you or for Canada. He’s just in it for himself.”1 A glowing portrait of the author-
turned-Liberal-leader that appeared in the New York Times provided Ignatieff with the opportu-
nity to counter such depictions by emphasizing the satisfaction of engagement: “I’m [in Parlia-
ment] to be serious. . . . This is the only place I can be a participant, not a spectator. I’ve been a 
spectator, and now I’m in the boat fishing. That part of it, from a spiritual point of view, it feels 
good.” 2  However, accusations of self-involvement and disengagement haunted Ignatieff 
throughout his short-lived political career, which culminated in the dubious distinction of lead-
ing the Liberal Party during an election that produced the worst results in the party’s history. As 
a result, he retired from politics in May 2011 and returned to academia.  
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In some sense, Ignatieff was easy prey for attacks questioning his sense of commitment 
since Ignatieff himself has explored the difficulty of ethical responsibility in his literary endeav-
ours, both scholarly and fictional. Ignatieff’s political aspirations initiated a new interest in his 
fiction,3 often as a means of gaining insight into his notoriously elusive character. After his ap-
pointment to the leadership of the Liberal Party in 2008, the Globe and Mail published an over-
view describing the plots of his novels and insisting that one should resist the temptation to 
“read politics and autobiography into the three novels” while at the same time wondering 
whether Ignatieff “would echo the main character in Scar Tissue when he says about the books he 
has written, ‘I know why they’re no better than they are, whereas I can’t begin to explain why I 
myself am no better than I am.’”4 This sense of inevitable failure runs throughout the novel, 
which treats the narrator’s experience of caregiving during his mother’s illness and death. The 
public persona constructed and criticized by Ignatieff’s political opponents does indeed bear an 
uncanny resemblance to the narrative persona he creates in Scar Tissue, which is drawn from the 
sad experiences of his family but refashioned into a figure whose obsessive immersion into the 
caregiving relationship becomes at once a narcissistic immersion into self and, paradoxically, a 
painful act of detachment. 
If, as Michael Stickings, Canadian correspondent for the Guardian, claims, Ignatieff’s politi-
cal weakness was his failure to “care deeply about this country,”5 then Ignatieff’s narrator’s weak-
ness might stem from caring too intensely, problematically so. The narrator’s caregiving 
practices collapse the boundaries between self and other and reveal the strangely self-involved 
and even paradoxically detached structure that undergirds his embodiment of the caregiver role. 
As Michael Valpy explains in his lengthy portrait of Ignatieff for the Globe and Mail, many re-
viewers have interpreted the novel as autobiographical since Ignatieff’s mother, Alison, died 
from Alzheimer’s a year before its publication. But the novel is most compelling in its focused 
scrutiny of the ethical implications of the narrator’s involvement in caregiving, which is fictional. 
As Valpy points out, it was Ignatieff’s brother, Andrew, not Michael, who was Alison’s primary 
caregiver. By his own account, Ignatieff visited Andrew and Alison in Toronto once or twice a 
year. Ignatieff seems to have preferred representation to participation, producing stories and ar-
ticles about his mother’s Alzheimer’s that became a source of family conflict. In particular, An-
drew has expressed his displeasure with Michael’s quasi-voyeuristic treatment of the family’s 
pain. If, as Ignatieff claims, his writing about family is a “process of self-invention,” then one 
might regard Scar Tissue as an effort to conjure the relations of care and responsibility that have 
disturbed and eluded him.6  
Unlike his brother in the novel, who remains largely distant and unaffected throughout 
their mother’s illness, the narrator struggles to locate a tenable position between spectatorship 
and participation as his mother’s illness worsens, requiring more and more care. The narrator 
shifts from uncomprehending spectator transfixed by the mysteries of illness and mortality, by 
 
3 Ignatieff has published three novels: Asya (Toronto: Viking, 1991); Scar Tissue (Toronto: Penguin, 1993); and 
Charlie Johnson in the Flames (Toronto: Viking, 2003). Scar Tissue was shortlisted for the Booker Prize. 
4 Fraser Sutherland, “Michael Ignatieff, Novelist,” Globe and Mail, February 28, 2009, 
www.theglobeandmail.com/news/arts/books/article973606.ece (accessed March 10, 2009). 
5 Michael Stickings, “The Audacity of Michael Ignatieff,” Guardian, February 23, 2009, 
www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/feb/13/michael-ignatieff-canada-economy (accessed March 
6, 2009). 
6 Michael Valpy, “Being Michael Ignatieff,” Globe and Mail, August 26, 2006, 
www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/article841745.ece (accessed March 6, 2009). 
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the fallibility of the body and mind, into an obsessively devoted caregiver whose sense of self 
blurs into the subject of his care. Initially, he perceives his mother as an afflicted other, but once 
his father dies and his mother is moved into an assisted-living facility, the narrator pledges his life 
to caring for her. His life is so singular in its purpose of providing care that he eventually aban-
dons his obligations to his wife and children in order to assist his mother. He even has an affair 
with his mother’s “intuitive,” “gift[ed]” nurse,7 Miranda, following which he leaves his wife and 
children to live in a shabby apartment a stone’s throw from his mother’s new accommodation.  
In this essay I address, not the relation between Michael and Alison Ignatieff, but rather the 
ethical implications of the central relationship between the narrator and his ailing mother in this 
novel, which explores the repercussions and reverberations of pathological memory loss in old 
age. In particular, I examine how the narrator’s experience as caregiver affects his subjectivity by 
considering the novel in tandem with ethical theories that privilege witnessing, dependence, and 
interrelation as integral to survival and subjectivity. The narrator’s reaction to ethical obligation 
presents a compelling test case for considering the confluence of responsibility and identity. Scar 
Tissue treats the confluence of aging, old age, memory, and aesthetics in its representation of 
dementia’s impact on both the afflicted and her caregivers. In its self-conscious exploration of 
the painful, vexing convergence of theory and praxis in experiences of caregiving, the novel con-
fronts the consequences of helplessness and responsibility, dependence and obligation.  
The novel opens with a lament for the past, reproducing, reluctantly, a memory of his 
mother’s final moments of life, a recollection that plagues him with its meaninglessness. It is this 
haunting memory that provides the impetus for the narrative itself: he clings to the possibility 
that testimony may emancipate him, that storytelling may somehow “redeem this” and help him 
to “believe that the banal heartlessness of it all was not for nothing” (1). He longs to replace tor-
turous recollections with comforting images of health, “when she was in her painting clothes, 
barefoot, sipping a beer, humming to herself, happy and far away. That is how she should be re-
membered” (1). This opening paragraph introduces both the narrative’s subject and its purpose: 
his vital, vibrant mother “must” be “rescue[d] from her dying, if such a thing can be done” (1). 
In this sense, storytelling is part of providing care, for both the person and her memory. Prefac-
ing this opening remembrance is an epigraph by Milton: “So by this infirmity may I be perfected, 
by this completed. So in this darkness, may I be clothed in light.” The lines introduce the novel’s 
preoccupation with comprehension, the narrator’s eagerness to shed light on the mysteries of 
illness and death. The quotation is a reference to Milton’s blindness, thereby connecting Mil-
ton’s hope for enlightenment through “infirmity” with the narrator’s redemptive quest for in-
sight through blindness. The novel abounds with moments of self-reflexive vision, observations, 
gazes, and the language of eyes and blindness. Witnesses are often spectators, helpless to com-
prehend or assuage the suffering they observe. Whether produced by the uncomprehending 
stare of the narrating son or the mechanical gaze of medical equipment, in Ignatieff’s novel sight 
fails to become insight. This failure of comprehension, which the narrator seeks to redress with 
his narrative of illness, coincides with a perceived failure of care since, for the philosopher son, 
care depends on making sense of his mother’s dementia-stricken subjectivity. In other words, 
the narrator maintains a definition of care as understanding, as ordered comprehension that is at 
odds with the disordered obscurity of dementia.  
The unnamed narrator’s redemptive narrative quest reflects alchemical desires: the longing to 
transform suffering into philosophical meaning, mystery into clear truths, incomprehension and 
 
7 Ignatieff, Scar Tissue, 110. Hereafter, page references to Scar Tissue will be given in parentheses in the text. 
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confusion into knowledge and insight. I argue that the novel’s recurring images of blindness and 
sight reflect the narrator’s consuming urge to redeem pain through narrative knowledge. But in his 
desire to see and comprehend, the narrator transgresses the ethical obligation to respect alterity.8 
The narrator’s obsessive need to penetrate his mother’s alterity culminates in an absorption of oth-
erness, an alienation from the world, and a manic pursuit of “selflessness,” what he calls “the strange 
joy of being utterly alone” (176). As he approaches the incomprehensible (dementia, illness, mortal-
ity), he retreats from interactions with others, severing the ties of witnessing and responsibility that 
philosopher Kelly Oliver regards as integral for subjectivity.9 I argue that the narrator’s belief in care 
as comprehension results in obsessive, frustrated efforts at “adequation,” a term James Meffan and 
Kim Worthington take from Levinas to describe “the process by which the Other is rendered intelli-
gible (‘seen’) through representation.”10 Caring for his ailing mother, the narrator confronts a di-
lemma: he can either deny dementia’s unintelligibility and the alterity it imposes upon its victim, or 
he can lose himself in the mystery of illness, the alterity of mortality. The spuriousness of the duality 
is irrelevant to the narrator, who remains trapped by an epistemological craving that sees him pro-
gress from denying alterity to absorbing it. His goal is to represent alterity and “redeem” it with nar-
rative; but alterity cannot be comprehended or salvaged. Instead, the other’s alterity when 
determined by dementia becomes increasingly assertive, confounding, and distressing, and rather 
than rendering the other intelligible, the narrator instead seems to absorb unintelligibility, becoming 
increasingly estranged from those around him. He observes his mother’s illness and death, but his 
witnessing is single-minded, the desire for comprehension diminishing opportunities for the re-
spectful, sympathetic listening that is fundamental to processes of testimonial. 
As critics such as Cathy Caruth, Shoshana Felman, Dori Laub, and Kelly Oliver have demon-
strated, the witness occupies an integral role in the process of coming to terms with trauma.11 
Trauma, the experience beyond comprehension, which returns to haunt its victim, is connected to 
storytelling since it is, in Caruth’s terms, “always the story of a wound that cries out, that addresses 
us in the attempt to tell us of a reality or truth that is not otherwise available.”12 The difficulty of 
“knowing” trauma is integral to the dynamic of the witness and the survivor. The victim must tell 
“not only the reality of the violent event but also the reality of the way that its violence has not yet 
been fully known.”13 In a sense, a tolerance of incomprehensibility is vital for the witness since the 
traumatic experience is one that surpasses understanding and can be expressed and interpreted 
only obliquely. Victims tell stories in order to survive. As Laub explains, “There is, in each survivor, 
an imperative need to tell and thus to come to know one’s story, unimpeded by ghosts from the past 
 
8 Here I am relying on Levinas’s vision of alterity and its attendant claims on the self. Though I do not adopt the 
absolutism of Levinas’s theory of infinite indebtedness, his claim that subjectivity is a consequence of responsibility is 
at the heart of much of my analysis. See Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being; or, Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso 
Lingis (London: Kluwer Academic, 1991), 117–18. 
9 Kelly Oliver, Witnessing: Beyond Recognition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 7. 
10 James Meffan and Kim L. Worthington, “Ethics before Politics,” in Mapping the Ethical Turn: A Reader in Ethics, 
Culture, and Literary Theory, ed. Todd F. Davis and Kenneth Womack (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 
2001), 134. 
11 See Cathy Caruth, “Trauma and Experience: Introduction,” in Trauma: Explorations in Memory, ed. Cathy Caruth 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 3–12; Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises of 
Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History (New York: Routledge, 1992); Oliver, Witnessing. 
12 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1996), 4. 
13 Ibid., 6. 
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against which one has to protect oneself. One has to know one’s buried truth in order to be able to 
live one’s life.”14 But witnessing is a daunting, even disturbing responsibility since it involves listen-
ing to suffering that can be neither discarded nor transformed. In other words, the witness can be-
come a vehicle, hollowed by his or her role as receptacle for another’s pain. Levinas constructs the 
witness as such a hollow instrument of the other, one who “testifies to what was said by himself. 
For he has said ‘Here I am!’ before the Other; and from the fact that before the Other he recog-
nizes the responsibility which is incumbent on himself, he has manifested what the face of the 
Other signified for him.”15 Levinas’s exacting vision of the survivor-witness relationship echoes his 
larger claims regarding the ethical responsibilities of the subject, the all-encompassing obligation of 
the self to the vulnerable other. For Levinas, subjectivity is predicated on obligation and debt, re-
flecting his belief that selfhood is attached to an awareness of responsibility. Such obligation can be 
refused, but the refusal brings its own repercussions: “The other haunts our ontological existence 
and keeps the psyche awake, in a state of vigilant insomnia. Even though we are ontologically free 
to refuse the other, we remain forever accused, with a bad conscience.”16 Scar Tissue depicts both 
the demands of obligation concomitant with selfhood and the torment that results from the inabil-
ity to meet those demands. 
Scar Tissue’s narrator wants witnessing to perform an empirical function, to produce 
knowledge of the value and meaning of the damaged body before him via the workings of sight. 
He appeals to what Foucault identifies, in The Birth of the Clinic, as the “suzerainty of the gaze,” a 
glorification of the visual stemming from nineteenth-century medicine.17 Foucault traces the 
effects of this empiricism—that is, the assumption that “illness is articulated exactly on the 
body”—on the discourse of pathology, which comes to focus on physical clues and signs and to 
ignore, even silence, the suffering subject.18 Within this relatively new medical discourse, “the 
eye becomes the depositary and source of clarity; it has the power to bring a truth to light that it 
receives only to the extent that it has brought it to light; as it opens, the eye first opens the truth: 
a flexion that marks the transition from the world of classical clarity—from the ‘enlighten-
ment’—to the nineteenth century.”19 The belief in such a penetrating, enlightening gaze haunts 
Ignatieff’s narrator, whose philosophical training conditions him to seek logic and rational an-
swers, to satisfy “philosophy’s love of tidiness.”20 The medical gaze should enlighten and explain, 
 
14 Dori Laub, “Truth and Testimony: The Process and the Struggle,” in Caruth, Trauma: Explorations in Memory, 63. 
15 Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo, trans. Richard Cohen (Pittsburgh, PA: 
Duquesne University Press, 1985), 109. The “hollowness” of the witness is even more pronounced in Felman’s 
idiosyncratic translation of this passage: “‘The witness . . . testifies to what has been said through him. Because the 
witness has said “here I am” before the other.’ By virtue of the fact that the testimony is addressed to others, the 
witness, from within the solitude of his own stance, is the vehicle of an occurrence, a reality, a stance or a dimension 
beyond himself” (Felman and Laub, Testimony, 3). 
16 Emmanuel Levinas and Richard Kearney, “Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas,” in Face to Face with Levinas, ed. 
Richard A. Cohen (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), 27–28. 
17 Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic, trans. A. M. Sheridan (New York: Routledge, 2003), 4. 
18 Ibid., 4. 
19 Ibid., xiii. 
20 Marlene Goldman, “Introduction: Literature, Imagination, Ethics,” University of  
Toronto Quarterly 76, no. 3 (2007): 814. Goldman’s phrasing draws on Jane Adamson’s article “Against Tidiness: 
Literature and/versus Moral Philosophy,” in Negotiating Ethics in Literature, Philosophy, and Theory, ed. Jane 
Adamson, Richard Freadman, and David Parker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 108, which 
examines the tension between literature’s embrace of ambiguity and moral philosophy’s reliance on “intellectual 
control.” 
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exposing hidden truths: “The residence of truth in the dark centre of things is linked, paradoxi-
cally, to this sovereign power of the empirical gaze that turns their darkness into light.”21 The 
metaphorical image of knowledge as a light shone on a “dark centre” recalls Scar Tissue’s epi-
graph, Milton’s hope that illness may provoke illumination. According to this empirical ethos, 
care, particularly medical care, involves looking, seeing, knowing. Caregiving involves illuminat-
ing the darkness of illness with the bright, clear light of diagnosis. 
Perhaps all illness has an impenetrable darkness at its core, but dementing diseases such as 
Alzheimer’s produce a persistent, and often devastating, obscurity. Alzheimer’s and its attendant 
dementia provoke anxiety as harbingers of memory loss and the erosion of identity. Though the 
majority of people who reach old age will not suffer from dementia, awareness of its debilitating 
power casts a heavy shadow. The aversion to dementia provokes Christine Cassel, former presi-
dent of the American College of Physicians, to label “dementing illness . . . the single most pow-
erful factor in the negative attitudes about aging that occur in our society and throughout the 
world. . . . The stereotype of the elderly person as inevitably ‘losing it’ is an enormous barrier to 
progress in productive aging.”22 Alzheimer’s and other illnesses causing dementia are alarming 
for their ability to disassemble, or even eradicate, memory, rendering victims strangers to them-
selves and those who care for them. Ignatieff’s narrator grapples with the profound impenetrabil-
ity of dementia, which eventually overtakes his mother, his family history, his personal identity, 
in a cover of darkness that no inquiring gaze can enlighten. 
 The narrator’s brother, a neurologist, arranges for a variety of medical imaging (X-rays, 
CAT scans, and PET scans), mechanical gazes intended to show “where we are. How much time 
there is” (54). The machines produce images of the neurochemical movement within her brain. 
The medical gaze is all-seeing, producing a Foucauldian penetration of its object. But this gaze is 
at once all-powerful and impotent, since it provides awareness without any promise of ameliora-
tion. The gaze of the PET and CAT scans provides images without insight; for the narrator and 
his family, the colorful scans initially remain mere images, devoid of meaning, since no interpre-
tation is supplied. Later, when a specialist attempts to provide the missing meaning, the explana-
tions are impersonal and unhelpful. “Your wife will be dead in three years” (57), the doctor tells 
the narrator’s father. The narrator is unsatisfied with the pronouncement since the diagnosis fails 
to account for the particularities of his mother as a subject, as more than a dehumanized “case,” 
or object of scans. “You keep telling me what has been lost, and I keep telling you something re-
mains” (58), he tells the doctor. But her response returns the conversation to the limited insight 
of the diagnostic gaze: “I just see what I see” (58), she informs him, the circular defense omitting 
understanding, producing a proliferation of gazes without meaning. The narrator continues to 
resist this clinical vision of his mother, insisting that what the scans fail to record is that his 
“mother’s true self remains intact at the surface of her being, like a feather resting on the surface 
tension of a glass of water” (58). The conflict between these two visions, the starkly clinical scans 
and the poetically ambiguous image of vulnerability, share a figurative approach to the other, 
both representing the patient with indirect images. The doctor relies on metonymic interpreta-
tion, allowing scans to replace the person, while the narrator conjures a simile to represent his 
mother’s identity. While different, both analyses attempt to encapsulate a subject in a particular 
 
21 Foucault, Birth of the Clinic, xiii–xiv. 
22 Christine K. Cassel, foreword to Ethical Foundations of Palliative Care for Alzheimer Disease, ed. Ruth B. Purtilo 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), x. 
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visual image, transforming an absolute other into a relative other, a form of adequation, the other 
rendered intelligible through figurative representation. 
Though Ignatieff’s narrator rages against the dehumanizing clinical gaze, he, too, is removed 
from the scenes of suffering before him. For example, early in the novel, while his mother is still liv-
ing at home with his father, the narrator refrains from intervening as he witnesses his parents grap-
ple with the painful, day-to-day struggles of both care giving and care receiving. Awoken by 
scuffling noises in the next room, the narrator rises from bed and follows his parents from a dis-
tance as they shuffle their way down the stairs. He pauses at the landing and watches unseen as his 
parents begin to struggle at the front door: “At first I thought they were embracing [but] she was 
fighting to break free of his grip” (74). He observes his mother’s efforts to strike his father, their 
desperate thrashing transformed into theater for a secret audience: they become “like two figures 
in a tragedy” (75), eventually falling to the floor with a groan. Throughout it all, the narrator re-
mains hidden: “Too late to stop them, too late to lift them up, I stood on the stairs watching my 
parents sobbing on all fours in the dark” (75). The scene is an arresting demonstration of vulner-
ability and suffering that inspires a kind of inverted voyeurism in which the narrator spies on his 
parents, not for pleasure, but for pain. He watches as a spectator, divorced from the drama that un-
folds, grimly aware of, as well as somehow sequestered by, his inability to alter or assist those before 
him. He becomes paralyzed by watching the suffering of others, once again unable to participate.  
After his mother’s death, the narrator embarks on a crazed philosophical project to examine 
the condition of “selflessness,” attempting, in the process, to initiate his own freedom from 
selfhood. It is notable that his project explores an attitude often associated with the performance 
of care: that is, the selfless attention to the needs of another. But for the narrator, in accordance 
with his attitude toward illness and loss throughout the novel, his approach to selflessness is a 
self-reflexive inquiry into the personal repercussions of tragedy. This solipsism has a powerful an-
tecedent when, shortly after his mother’s diagnosis, the narrator conducts a morbid lecture on 
illness and death with his mother in the audience. The narrator cannot understand why his 
mother flees the auditorium as soon as the lecture concludes. He insists that his lecture was 
“about [his] own death, not hers,” but his wife is more perceptive: “I don’t care what you 
thought you were doing. Think about what it sounded like to her. You were saying to her, ‘You 
are going to struggle, and it won’t make all that much difference because you are going to die, 
and all of us are going to have to accept that’” (69–70). This solipsism recurs in his aesthetic re-
sponse to aging, expressed in his philosophy of “selflessness.” His attempt to adopt his mother’s 
pathology, to exist without selfhood, is an attempt to flee from responsibility by denying his very 
response-ability. As a self-less creature he is removed from the relational identity that comes 
with human dependence and obligation. His flight from others becomes a joyfully manic escape 
as he transforms his disposal of interrelation and identity into a quest for “purity” (176). He de-
scribes the project as “filling the empty place in my day which had once been taken up in the 
nursing home” but also insists that the writing is in no way “a compensation for anything, or . . . a 
working out of some unresolved emotion” (176; unlike the novel itself, which is meant to re-
deem). Instead, he acknowledges only “enormous relief that the long ordeal was over. I suddenly 
felt the strange joy of being utterly alone” (176). The referent of “ordeal” has many possibilities: 
care for his mother; obligations to his wife, his girlfriend, his children—all these responsibilities 
must be discarded to achieve the pureness of being he seeks. But the example he provides for 
“selflessness” and the “fullness of pure being” is one of degradation. He describes author 
Malcolm Lowry’s final experience of “fullness” as he lay dying in an incontinent “heap,” ac-
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knowledging that the silencing of the self came “at the cost of [Lowry’s] sanity” (176). The nar-
rator’s failure to comprehend the illness and suffering he has witnessed (his mother’s illness, the 
deaths of both his parents) leads him to seek a territory beyond comprehension, going so far as 
to embrace the debasement that coincides with complete alienation. He longs to find a way to 
live without the knowledge and the understanding that have failed him, without human connec-
tion, without response-ability and the obligation it engenders.  
But the obsession does not last, and he looks back on his “manic treatise” with embarrassment 
once he has abandoned his quest (179). He continues to live in his “efficiency apartment,” from 
which he can “see the nursing home and [his] mother’s room, now dark” (192). Despite such keen 
sight into the outside world, he has trouble recognizing or even discerning his own reflection since 
his “eyes have disappeared” (193). Instead, he sees only “the shadows of two former faces,” which 
hover “behind the outlines of my jaw, my eye, and my forehead. Now at last, as I look at the night 
reflections in the glass, I see Mother, Father, the faces of the dead” (193). In his attention to the de-
tails of his mother’s deterioration, his own identity has blurred so profoundly that he cannot distin-
guish himself from the former objects of his care. For the narrator, care is an all-encompassing 
dedication that hollows the caregiver, transforming him into a receptacle for another’s needs, de-
sire, even identity. This profound amalgamation leaves him struggling to carve out a discrete space 
of identity once the object of care has departed, wondering, “What was mine? What was the margin 
beyond inheritance?” (193). He longs, still, for enlightening vision.  
But time, change, and illness thwart perfectible knowledge. The novel’s final pages address 
the problem of blindness head-on, encapsulating the desire for illumination, the frustration of 
ignorance, and the obsession with preserving the past. The narrator recalls a vivid scene from his 
time as caregiver when he brought his ailing mother a photograph of himself as a child, ostensi-
bly to comfort her, though his desire for recognition and validation is apparent. But his mother’s 
response to the gift is shockingly vicious:  
I wanted to pin this picture up on the bulletin board beside my mother’s bed. I had already 
laid the pin in the centre of the top margin of the picture when I placed the photo in her 
hand. She held it there for a second and stared carefully at this image of a child who was 
once her son. Then with sudden, savage deliberation, she removed the pin and jabbed at the 
picture, puncturing both of my eyes. (198) 
The narrator’s interpretation is quick but shifting, changing in accordance with his philosophical 
perspective: “there was not a shadow of a doubt as to what she intended. It had been a blinding. 
Now, of course, I understand. If you hold the picture up to the light, radiant illumination streams 
through the eyes. It is the light streaming from the terrain beyond the gates of truth” (198). The 
narrator reincorporates his mother’s expression of anger, confusion, resentment, appreciation, 
frustration—the list can go on and on, so mysterious is dementia—into his own themes of con-
cealment and revelation, falsity and truth, protecting him from the opacity of alterity. The narra-
tor’s responses to the punctured photograph reflect his belief in limitless illumination and 
insight, his refusal to acknowledge the alterity of illness. Once again, an expression of care, giving 
his mother a photograph of her young son, initiates a process of self-reflection. In effect, the 
mother’s illness functions as a catalyst igniting the flames of self-interpretation. It is not the im-
age’s eyes but “my” eyes that are wounded by the pin. The narrator envisions his own future 
when he witnesses his mother’s suffering.  
The novel’s final paragraphs treat the self and its miserable fate: “This room will soon be-
come a prison. The doors will be locked. . . . The faces of my wife, my children and my brother 
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will blur, decompose and then reform into the image of jailers. My own hands, my own face, my 
own thoughts will seem alien to me” (199). Despite the defacement of the narrator’s portrait, it 
is the mother whose image becomes distorted and then lost as the narrator effectively uses her 
suffering to anticipate his own. When he looks at her, it is his own fate, his own struggles and de-
sires, that he sees. In this sense, the mother’s photographic blinding suggests a profound and 
painful insight into her son’s blind attention, an uncanny awareness of the implications of his 
care. His mother’s story, which he promised to deliver at the novel’s outset, has become his own 
narrative, his obsession with family inheritance23 initiating the conflation of “she” and “I.” 
 For Ignatieff’s narrator, care is an all-encompassing activity, a dedication of one person to 
another that verges on the devotional. But such devotion has serious consequences for the care-
giver and the various relationships that contribute to his identity. Care becomes suspect as the 
narrator’s attention to his mother becomes an exclusive focus, an inquiring gaze into his moth-
er’s illness that transforms into solipsism after her death, undermining feminist visions of care as 
mutually beneficial. Ethics-of-care philosophers typically regard caring as involving labor and re-
lationships—as relational practices that emphasize mutual recognition and development and 
foster well-being, social bonds, and cooperation—and as the productive result of human in-
terdependency.24 However, Ignatieff’s narrator approaches caregiving not as a means toward 
well-being but as an occasion for inquiry and exploration, regarding his mother’s alterity as a 
“philosophical problem” (53) in need of an impossible solution, or, in other words, a story in 
need of redemption, as he explains in the novel’s opening pages.  
Though caring involves both givers and receivers, reciprocity is often limited by ability, and 
for many philosophers of care and ethics, the emphasis is primarily on the needs of the other. In her 
definition of “care,” Diemut Bubeck describes it as “fundamentally other-directed and beneficial to 
others.”25 Care is “committed to the flourishing and growth of individuals yet acknowledges our inter-
connectedness and interdependence.”26 But such an unflagging commitment to the other can be at 
odds with modern glorifications of personal independence, making both dependence and devotion 
into identity handicaps. The struggle between caring devotion and self-protection appears repeat-
edly in Scar Tissue as the narrator attempts to negotiate the expectations of care as a “morally ap-
propriate reaction to another’s needs.”27 For Derek Attridge, encountering the other involves the 
 
23 The narrator’s preoccupation with ancestry and inheritance mimics Ignatieff’s own obsession with family legacy, 
which has manifested itself in two family memoirs. The Russian Album (New York: Penguin, 1987) conjures the 
experiences of his father’s family in their move from Russia to Canada. More recently, he has explored his mother’s 
heritage in the seemingly politically inspired True Patriot Love: Four Generations in Search of Canada (Toronto: 
Penguin, 2009), which chronicles four generations of the Grants. 
24 See, in particular, Patricia Benner, Suzanne Gordon, and Nel Noddings, introduction to Caregiving: Readings in 
Knowledge, Practice, Ethics, and Politics, ed. Suzanne Gordon, Patricia Benner, and Nel Noddings (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), vii–xvi. See also Virginia Held, The Ethics of Care (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006); Maurice Hamington, Embodied Care: Jane Addams, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Feminist Ethics (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 2004); Eva Kittay, “When Caring Is Just and Justice Is Caring: Justice and Mental 
Retardation,” in Gordon, Benner, and Noddings, Caregiving, 257–76; Nel Noddings, “The Cared-For,” in Gordon, 
Benner, and Noddings, Caregiving, 21–39. 
25 Diemut Grace Bubeck, “Justice and the Labor of Care,” in The Subject of Care:  
Feminist Perspectives on Dependency, ed. Eva Feder Kittay and Ellen K. Feder (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 
2002), 160. 
26 Hamington, Embodied Care, 3. 
27 Sarah Clark Miller, “Need, Care and Obligation,” in The Philosophy of Need, ed. Soran Reader (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 142. 
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“impossibility of finding general rules or schemata to account fully for him or her. . . . The experi-
ence is an encounter with the limits of one’s power to think and to judge, a challenge to one’s ca-
pacities as a rational agent.”28 And though one may not comprehend or know the other, he or she 
will make demands, demands of responsibility and obligation that often outrun the capacity of the 
self. In Scar Tissue the narrator encounters the alterity of his closest relative, and the ensuing rela-
tions of dependence and responsibility challenge his own sense of self.29 
In Camera Lucida, Roland Barthes explores the uncanny status of the photograph, which 
evokes past and present simultaneously, allowing one to be at once object and subject: “the Photo-
graph is the advent of myself as other: a cunning dissociation of consciousness from identity.”30 For 
Barthes, the photograph produces a kind of double vision as the viewer witnesses both the image 
and its genetic referents, the subject and its relations: “The Photograph is like old age: even in its 
splendor, it disincarnates the face, manifests its genetic essence.”31 As a result, photographs can pro-
voke vertigo: seeing oneself in a photograph produces a blurring as one experiences being “neither 
subject nor object but a subject who feels he is becoming an object . . . a micro-version of death.”32 
Though they are different genres, Camera Lucida and Scar Tissue share a mournful, reflective tone. 
Like the fictional narrator of Ignatieff’s novel, Barthes wrote Camera Lucida in response to his 
mother’s death. Encountering a photograph of his mother as a child, Barthes “shudder[s] over a 
catastrophe which has already occurred. Whether or not the subject is already dead, every 
photograph is this catastrophe.”33 Photographs conjure death in their attestation of what “has been” 
and is no longer. There are echoes of Barthes in Ignatieff’s unease with photographic traces, to which 
he confesses in his family memoir The Russian Album, published six years prior to Scar Tissue. In The 
Russian Album he contrasts recollection with photographic evidence, lionizing the former as 
restorative, denigrating the latter as merely documentary: “Memory heals the scars of time,” he 
writes. “Photography documents the wounds.”34 Scar Tissue appears to continue this dichotomous 
interpretation: setting out to heal through narrative remembrance, it eventually stumbles over 
untreatable photographic wounds. In this case the “wounding” is literalized in the punctured eyes of 
the narrator’s photographic self, an injury that speaks to the impotence of recollection to heal the 
wounds of dementia, a condition that manifests itself in the dismantling of memory. The defaced 
photograph calls attention to that which the narrator (like the author) would prefer to forget: that 
some wounds persist, deep and unhealable, refusing all efforts at care and repair. There are, perhaps, 
some wounds that demand respect and nothing more.  
 
28 Derek Attridge, “Innovation, Literature, Ethics: Relating to the Other,” PMLA 114, no. 1 (1999): 24. 
29 Stan van Hooft stresses the self-oriented aspects of care, going so far as to construct caring as a “self-project,” that is, 
a demonstration of self: “my faithfulness to what I care about, my commitment to it, is an expression of my deep 
care. . . . And deep care provides the internal motivational strength so to act. When one acts caringly, one implicates 
oneself in what one does, and that is why it matters” (Caring: An Essay in the Philosophy of Ethics [Niwot: University 
Press of Colorado, 1995], 47). 
30 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1981), 12. 
31 Ibid., 105. 
32 Ibid., 14. 
33 Ibid., 96. 
34 Ignatieff, Russian Album, 7. 
